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Introduction
The past few years have not been kind to television network ABC
and its investigative news programs. In 1995, Capital Cities/ABC Inc.
reached an expensive and highly criticized out-of-court settlement
with tobacco industry giant Philip Morris Co., Inc. 1 for allegedly2
defamatory statements on the now defunct news magazine, Day One.
Fewer than two years later, a North Carolina jury found ABC liable
for fraud and trespass for investigative techniques used by PrimeTime
Live producers and awarded the plaintiff, Food Lion Inc., a whopping
$5.5 million in punitive damages. 3 Around the time that the North
Carolina jury made its decision, a jury in Florida awarded $10 million
to the plaintiffs in a defamation action filed against ABC for reports
broadcast on 20/20. 4 Investigative journalism at ABC luickly is
becoming a litigiously dangerous and expensive proposition.

1. Philip Morris, maker of Marlboro cigarettes, is the world's biggest cigarette
maker. Still Smokin', ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 1995, at 61. The company held 44.8% of the
United States cigarette market in 1994. Id. at 62. The total tobacco industry business in the
United States is about $45 billion a year. PHILIP J. HILTS, SMOKESCREEN: THE TRUTH
BEHIND THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY COVER-UP 4 (1996).
2. See generally Clay Calvert, Stumbling Down Tobacco Road: Media SelfCensorshipand Corporate Capitulation in the War on the Cigarette Industry, 30 LoY. L.A.
L. REV. 139 (1996) [hereinafter Stumbling] (analyzing the reasons why ABC settled the
defamation action filed against it by Philip Morris); Clay Calvert, The Reporter's Privilege
v. The Corporate-InterestMuzzle: Philip Morris Co., Inc. v. ABC, Inc., 22 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 1 (1996) (providing an analysis of both the reporter's privilege issues and the
settlement decision); Alicia C. Shepard, Up in Smoke, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov. 1995,
at 28 (describing the facts and events leading up to ABC's decision to settle the defamation
lawsuit); Steve Weinberg, Smoking Guns: ABC, Philip Morris,and the Infamous Apology,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 29 (providing a succinct background and
analysis of the defamation action and settlement).
3. See Howard Kurtz & Sue Anne Pressley, Jury Finds Against ABC for $5.5 Million,
WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1997, at Al; William Powers, Making Sausage, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan.
20, 1997, at 14; Eleanor Randolph, N.C. Jury Orders ABC to Pay $5.5 Million in HiddenCamera Case, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1997, at A15. In August, 1997, a federal judge reduced
the punitive damages to be paid by Capital Cities, ABC, and two ABC employees to
$315,000. Lawrie Mifflin, Judge Slashes $5.5 Million Award to Grocery Chain for ABC
Report, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1997, at 1.
4. Bank Awarded $10 Million In Libel Case Against ABC, Media L. Rep. (BNA),
Jan. 14, 1997, at News Notes.
5. In addition to these three cases, several other lawsuits recently were filed against
ABC and PrimeTime Live. See Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church, Inc. v.
Sawyer, 90 F.3d 118, 120 (5th Cir. 1996) (involving reports on PrimeTime Live critical of
Reverend Robert Tilton and the Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church); Desnick
v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1347 (7th Cir. 1995) (involving trespass,
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The recent high-profile cases of Philip Morris Co., Inc. v.
American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.6 and Food Lion Inc. v.
Capital Cities/ABC Inc. 7 have more in common, however, than the
same network and disastrous defeats for investigative reportage. In

fact, a common-and positive-thread running through the two cases
is judicial decisions favorable to the press in the area of source
confidentiality. In both Philip Morris and Food Lion, trial court8
judges extended the scope of the qualified First Amendment
reporter's privilege 9 to protect against the discovery of sources

through the use of disinterested third-party subpoenas. 10 In brief, they
held that indirect discovery of source identity falls within the scope of
First Amendment protection that guards the press in its news
gathering capacity. These important legal victories, examined in this
article, should not be lost amidst the wreckage of ABC's defeats.
Part I of this article analyzes the reporter-friendly rulings on the
source confidentiality issue in Philip Morris and Food Lion. Shifting
gears, Part II argues that although courts are willing to protect some
investigative news gathering practices (namely the use of confidential
defamation, and other torts arising out of the production and broadcast of a PrimeTime
Live segment); Kersis v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2321 (Cal.
1994) (jury awarding more than $1 million against ABC arising from PrimeTime Live
segment on psychic-advice telephone.services).
The Kersis decision, however, was recently overturned on appeal, with ABC calling
the appellate court's decision to reverse the judgment for the plaintiff a vindication of its
undercover reporting. Bill Carter, Judgment Against ABC for Use of Hidden Cameras is
Reversed, N.Y.,TIMES, Feb. 4, 1997, at A16. Regardless of the outcome of such cases,
however, defense costs are often high, with the average cost of defending a libel action
running at about $100,000. DONALD M. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 119 (1997). The mere
act of defending such cases thus can have a chilling effect on investigative reporting, even if
the news organization ultimately prevails on appeal.
6. 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1434 (D.Va. 1995) [hereinafter Philip Morris Co. I],
modified, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2438 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1995) [hereinafter Philip Morris
Co. II].
7. 887 F. Supp. 811 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
8. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part
that Congress shall make no law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses of the First Amendment have
been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to apply to
state and local governmental entities. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
9. There is "a substantial body of case law recognizing a reporter's limited privilege,
under the First Amendment, to resist subpoenas. Most of the federal courts of appeals
have recognized the privilege, as have many state courts." JOHN D. ZELEZNY,
COMMUNICATIONS LAW: LIBERTIES, RESTRAINTS, AND THE MODERN MEDIA 260 (2d ed.
1997).
10. See infra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[VOL. 19:795

sources) other techniques, such as fraud and trespass, remain outside
the realm of judicial protection and, conversely, well within the range
of judicial and juror scorn. The important victories scored by ABC in
the area of source confidentiality will continue to be nullified if
members of the press transgress generally applicable laws, such as
fraud and trespass, that apply to all individuals. Courts, although
willing to extend a layer of constitutional protection to the press in its
use of confidential sources, are not yet ready or willing to create a
buffer zone of First Amendment protection for the press around
generally applicable laws that do not, on their face, target either
speech or the press. That lesson, from the Supreme Court's decision in
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,11 apparently has gone unheeded by
investigative journalists such as those at ABC who push the envelope
of acceptable news gathering practices too far for judicial protection.
Part II also critiques the apparent arrogance of some journalists who
flaunt generally applicable laws in the news gathering process and it
analyzes their somewhat hackneyed justification for intrusive news
gathering tactics-the public's so-called "right to know."
Part III concludes that increased and sustained introspection and
self-reflection by journalists-instead of their reflexive and defensive
First Amendment posturing 12 and sporadic fits of self-criticism-will
help journalists in the future score victories like the kind achieved in
the area of source confidentiality. 13 Journalists must be able to
11. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
12. For instance, Roone Arledge, president of ABC News and former producer of
Wide World of Sports, responded to the Food Lion verdict in a letter to The New York
Times by calling it "a war against investigative reporting." Roone Arledge, Hidden
Cameras Find the Truth, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1997, at 19. Apparently able to handle the
thrill of victory but not the agony of defeat, Arledge's response is indicative of the kind of
reflexive defensiveness that pervades the hierarchy of broadcast journalism. Rather than
considering whether it is wrong for journalists like those in the ABC stable to lie on job
applications and to knowingly create false references, Arledge called PrimeTime Live's
segment on Food Lion part of "a great tradition of American journalism." Id. For Arledge,
apparently, there is nothing wrong with telling lies, which is what his producers did in
gathering news about Food Lion. See infra note 63 and accompanying text (describing the
deception perpetrated by ABC producers to obtain the hidden-camera footage in the Food
Lion case).
13. See infra Part I. Much to ABC's credit, the network held a special "Viewpoint"
edition of Nightline shortly after the punitive damages decision to discuss the Food Lion
case and the general use of hidden cameras by investigative journalists. John Carmody,
The TV Column, WASH. POST, Feb. 12,1997, at D4. The show, taking place in a town hall
format from the campus of Wake Forest University in North Carolina, featured a group of
panelists including: 1) Roone Arledge, president of ABC News; 2) Don Hewett, executive
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provide to both the courts and the public well-reasoned and thorough
explanations for their news gathering tactics if they want to expand
the boundaries of First Amendment protection. It is no longer enough
to spout clich6s about an unenumerated right to know or to cloak
oneself in slogans about freedom of the press.
I
Promises of Confidentiality and the Reporter's Privilege
Journalists are in the business of gathering and disseminating
information. 14 In turn, "sources are the foundation of a journalist's
15
success, developed and nurtured and often protected for the future."
Sometimes gathering news from sources who are reluctant to have
their identities publicly revealed may lead journalists to offer promises
of confidentiality. "The principle of confidentiality imposes a duty to
withhold the names of sources of information or the information itself
from third parties under certain circumstances." 16 Furthermore, a
pledge of confidentiality is "typically the price that a journalist must
pay to secure meaningful information about
the operation of
17
government for dissemination to the public."
A reporter's privilege protects against the compelled disclosure of
a journalist's confidential sources in courtroom settings. The source of
this privilege sometimes "is based on the First Amendment,
sometimes on a statute or state constitutional law, and sometimes on
common law." 18 The United States Supreme Court's "first and only
producer of CBS news magazine, 60 Minutes; 3) Diane Sawyer, co-host with Sam
.Donaldson of PrimeTime Live; 4) Richard L. Wyatt, Jr., outside counsel for Food Lion,
Inc.; 5) Chris Ahearn, manager of corporate communications for Food Lion, Inc.; and 6)
Robert Lissit, Associate Professor of broadcast news at Syracuse University. Id.
This type of one-shot forum, although important and a necessary first step for a
serious analysis of deceptive and fraudulent investigative practices, is rendered somewhat
meaningless unless a sustained and informed dialogue occurs. More than sudden fits and
bursts of media self-reflection and critique are required if journalists want the public to
understand, accept, and value their investigative practices.
14. See JAY BLACK ET AL., DOING ETHICS IN JOURNALISM: A HANDBOOK WITH

CASE STUDIES 2 (2d ed. 1995) (stating that "the primary role of the journalist is to get and
report truthful news.").
15. Id. at 197.
16. LOuIS A. DAY, ETHICS IN MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS: CASES AND
CONTROVERSIES 154 (2d ed. 1997).
17. Monica Langley & Lee Levine, Branzburg Revisited: Confidential Sources and
FirstAmendment Values, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 13, 26 (1988).
18.

MARC A. FRANKLIN & DAVID A. ANDERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS

MEDIA LAW 483 (5th ed. 1995).
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discussion of the scope of the constitutional protections afforded a
19
journalist's promise of confidentiality to a source of20information"
occurred a quarter-century ago in Branzburg v. Hayes.
A. Branzburg v. Hayes
Branzburg was a consolidation of several cases involving
reporters who refused to provide grand jury testimony revealing their
sources. 21 The Supreme Court considered "whether requiring
newsmen to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries
abridges the freedom
of speech and press guaranteed by the First
22
Amendment."
The journalists argued that "the burden on news gathering
resulting from compelling reporters to disclose confidential
' 23
information outweighs any public interest in obtaining information."
The reporters claimed that "if forced to respond to subpoenas and
identify their sources or disclose other confidences, their informants
will refuse or be reluctant to furnish newsworthy information in the
future." 24 Sources would be unwilling to talk if reporters were
compelled to reveal their identities, "all to the detriment of the free
'25
flow of information protected by the First Amendment.
The Branzburg Court balanced the First Amendment interest in
news gathering against "the general obligation of a citizen to appear
before a grand jury or at trial, pursuant to a subpoena, and give what
information he possesses."26 The Court observed that the grand jury's
'27
ability to subpoena was "essential to its task."
The justices fractured badly in Branzburg. Justice Byron White,
writing the opinion of the Court, refused to create a First Amendment
testimonial privilege for reporters, reasoning that "the task of judges,
like other officials outside the legislative branch, is not to make the
19. Langley & Levine, supra note 17, at 13. Since Branzburg v. Hayes, the United
States Supreme Court "has consistently refused to hear journalist privilege cases."
DONALD M. GILMOUR ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 130

(1996).
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

408 U.S. 665 (1972).
408 U.S. at 665.
Id. at 667.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 680.
Id. at 686..
Id. at 688.
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law but to uphold it in accordance with their oaths." 28 In response to
reporters' calls for judicial creation of a qualified First Amendment
testimonial privilege for journalists, Justice White wrote "[w]e are
unwilling to embark the judiciary on a long and difficult journey to
such an uncertain destination. The administration of a constitutional
newsman's privilege would
present practical and conceptual
29
difficulties of a high order."
The crucial opinion in Branzburg, however, turned out to be
Justice Lewis Powell's concurrence. 30 That opinion transformed
Powell, at least in the eyes of journalists and in the words of First
31
Amendment scholar Lucas A. Powe, Jr., "into the Sainted Lewis."
Why? As media attorney James C. Goodale states, lower courts have
"generally concluded that Justice Powell's concurring opinion plus
Justice Stewart's and Justice Douglas' dissenting opinions provide the
basis for a qualified privilege." 32 Other scholars add that Powell's
"concurring opinion has been treated as authoritative." 33
Powell wrote to "emphasize the limited nature of the Court's
holding" 34 and to argue that whether a First Amendment privilege
protects against source revelation should be determined on a "caseby-case basis." 35 Powell stated:
[I]f the newsman is called upon to give information bearing only a
remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation,
or if he has some other reason to believe that his testimony
implicates confidential source relationships without a legitimate
need of law enforcement, he will have access to the
36 court on a
motion to quash and an appropriate protective order.
Coupling Justice Powell's concurrence with the opinions of the
four dissenting justices in Branzburg, "almost all federal and state
courts have acknowledged the existence of some form of qualified
constitutional privilege." 37 Media defense attorney Hal Fuson
28. Id. at 706.
29. Id. at 703-04.
30. Id. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
31. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 182 (1991).
32. James C. Goodale et al., Reporter's Privilege Cases, 2 COMM. LAW 1993, 397 (PLI
Pat., Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G-372).
33. ROBERT D. SACK & SANDRA S. BARON, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED
PROBLEMS 706 (2d ed. 1994).
34. Branzburg,408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
36. Id.
37. THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, THE FIRST
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observes that courts vary widely in defining the limits to the privilege
not to reveal sources. 38 Jane Kirtley, Executive Director of the
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, notes, however, that
courts that recognize a qualified First Amendment privilege
''generally utilize a three-part balancing test to assess whether the
subpoenaed information is clearly relevant and material to the
pending case, whether it goes 'to the heart of the case,' and
whether it
39
could be obtained from other sources besides the media."
Kirtley observes that "in libel cases, reporters who are defendants
are frequently subpoenaed because the allegedly defamatory reports
40
are based on information obtained from confidential sources."

Source identity is relevant to the issue of actual malice 41 in
defamation 4 2 cases

involving

public-figure 4 3 and

public-official

AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 36 (Jane E. Kirtley ed., 4th ed. 1995) [hereinafter HANDBOOK.
38. See HAROLD W. FUSON, JR., TELLING IT ALL: A LEGAL GUIDE TO THE
EXERCISE OF FREE SPEECH 79 (1995).

39. HANDBOOK, supra note 37, at 36.
40. Id. at 37.
41. Actual malice, a fault standard adopted by the Supreme Court in New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), is the publication of a statement with knowledge of its
falsity or with a reckless disregard for whether the statement is true or false. Id. at 279-80.
Reckless disregard for the truth, in turn, exists when a defendant "in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication," as in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S.
727, 731 (1968); or acted with a "high degree of awareness of ... probable falsity."
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964). The Supreme Court also has observed that
although a failure to investigate information standing alone will not support a finding of
actual malice, "the purposeful avoidance of the truth is in a different category." HarteHanks Communications v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 692 (1989).
A showing of negligence does not suffice to prove actual malice. Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991). Furthermore, actual malice "should not be
confused with the concept of malice as evil intent or a motive arising from spite or ill will."
Id.
42. Defamation encompasses the libel and slander torts. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 771 (5th ed. 1984). The basic

elements to state a cause of action for defamation include: (1) a false and defamatory
statement concerning another; (2) the unprivileged publication of that statement to at least
one third party; (3) fault; and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of
special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the statement. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977). "Libel is written or visual defamation; slander is oral or
aural defamation." SACK & BARON, supra note 33, at 67.
43. The United States Supreme Court has identified three categories of individuals
who may fall within the classification of public-figure plaintiffs for the purposes of libel
law-all-purpose public figures, voluntary limited-purpose public figures, and involuntary
limited-purpose public figures. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). The
Court observed in Gertz:
Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public figure through
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plaintiffs. 44 If a source is inherently untrustworthy or unbelievable,

this militates in favor of a finding of actual malice against the reporter
who relied on that source. Plaintiffs thus want to uncover the identity
of confidential sources to prove that these sources are inherently
privilege
unreliable or untrustworthy. Thus, efforts to overcome ' the
"seem to succeed somewhat more often in the libel field." 45
B.

The Reporter's Privilege and Third.Party Subpoenas
In Philip Morris Co., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Companies,

Inc., trial court judge Theodore J. Markow faced what he called an
issue "of first impression." 46 That same novel question, involving the
same defendant, arose again in 1996 in Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc. 4 7 In fact, the only precedent on the issue cited by the

in Food Lion was Judge Markow's decision in
federal magistrate
48
Philip Morris.

The issue? Does the scope of the qualified reporter's privilege
extend far enough to include protection against the disclosure of
confidential sources via service of subpoenas for documents upon
disinterested third parties such as hotels and telephone companies?
no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public
figures must be exceedingly rare. For the most part, those who attain this status
have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy
positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public
figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have
thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to
influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite
attention and comment.
IdL
44. Public-official plaintiffs in libel actions are government employees who: 1) have or
appear to have substantial responsibility over the control of government affairs; 2) usually
enjoy significantly greater access to the mass media to contradict false statements; 3) hold
a position of such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the
person's qualifications and performance beyond the general public interest in all
government employees; and 4) hold a position that invites public scrutiny and discussion of
the person entirely apart from the scrutiny caused by the particular controversy at issue.
James v. San Jose Mercury News, 17 Cal. App. 4th 1, 10 (1993).
45. FRANKLIN & ANDERSON, supra note 18, at 520. "Courts frequently order
journalists to reveal sources and notes when they are subpoenaed by libel plaintiffs. Judges
generally insist that libel plaintiffs must have the opportunity to prove that newspapers or
broadcast stations acted negligently or recklessly when preparing defamatory stories."
KENT R. MIDDLETON & BILL F. CHAMBERLIN, THE LAW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION
424 (3d ed. 1994).
46. 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1434,1435 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1995).
47. 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2431, 2432-33 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
48. Id. at 2433.
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Phrased differently, the query is: Does the constitutional reporter's
privilege protect against indirect efforts to discover the identity of
confidential sources in civil litigation settings in which the reporter is a
defendant?
49
In both cases, the rulings on this issue were favorable to ABC.

Before discussing the reasoning behind those decisions, however, a
brief background about the two cases and the nature of the disputes
over confidential sources is helpful.
1. The Disputes

Philip Morris and Food Lion were civil actions in which ABC and
its employees were defendants. The setting for Philip Morris was in
Virginia state court,5 ° while Food Lion transpired in federal court in
North Carolina. 51 The cause of action at issue in Philip Morris was
defamation, 52 while in Food Lion the crucial theories of relief were
55
trespass,53 fraud,54 and civil conspiracy.
49. See Philip Morris Co. 1, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1438 (concluding that "the
reporter's qualified privilege against the disclosure of confidential sources is held to extend
to any and all documentary or electronically compiled evidence that is the product of the
reporter's news gathering activities."); Food Lion, 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2433
(holding that third-party subpoenas "clearly infringe ABC's First Amendment rights with
regard to its confidential sources.").
50. Philip Morris Co. I, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1434. That setting-in tobacco
country-and the assigned judge concerned ABC. Judge Theodore J. Markow had a
brother and two brothers-in-law who worked for plaintiff Philip Morris. Howard Kurtz,
Long-Term Effect of ABC Settlement Concerns Critics, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 1995, at A4.
51. The setting for Food Lion was a federal district court in Greensboro, North
Carolina-a location perhaps more favorable to Food Lion than to ABC. In North
Carolina, "Food Lion is sometimes the only supermarket in town [and] people tend to see
it [Food Lion] as a local rather than a global institution, one by which neighbors and
friends are employed, one where they regularly shop for food and supplies. They may as a
result have seen this case in human as well as legal terms, and decided it accordingly."
Jonathan Yardley, The Food Lion Jurors' Reverberating Roar, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1997,
at C2.
52. Philip Morris Co. I, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1434. See supra note 42
(describing the defamation tort).
53. Under North Carolina trespass law, the plaintiff "must prove that: (1) plaintiff was
in possession of the land at the time of the alleged trespass; (2) defendant made an
unauthorized entry on the land; and (3) plaintiff was damaged by the alleged invasion of
his possessory rights." Taha v. Thompson, 463 S.E.2d 553, 557 (N.C. App. 1995). The
plaintiff, however, does not need to prove actual damages because any unauthorized entry
entitles plaintiff at least to nominal damages. Id.
54. Under the North Carolina law that applied in Food Lion, "[t]he essential elements
of an action based on fraud are: (1) a false representation or concealment of a material
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In Philip Morris, the giant tobacco manufacturer sought to
uncover the identity of sources that ABC relied on for statements
made on two Day One segments dealing with the process of nicotine
reconstitution. 5 6 In particular, Philip Morris sought the identity of one
source fittingly dubbed "Deep Cough" whose statements were pivotal
in supporting what Philip Morris contended was the defamatory
message from the broadcasts-that it adds nicotine from extraneous
sources to its cigarettes. 57 When ABC refused to disclose Deep
Cough's identity, Philip Morris served subpoenas for the production
of documents upon non-parties to the case, including American
Express, Citibank, USAir, United Airlines, AT&T, Cellular One, Bell
Atlantic and Hertz. 5 8 Why serve these parties? As Judge Markow put
it, Philip Morris sought "to trace the movements of the defendants in
the course of their investigation in the hope of identifying their
confidential sources." 59 These companies' documents would allow
Philip Morris to trace the steps of ABC's producers and reporters in
their news gathering and potentially lead down the road toward the
discovery of the identity of ABC's sources. ABC moved to quash the
subpoenas, arguing that "discovery from disinterested non-parties is
tantamount to asking the reporter directly [the identity of sources]
fact; (2) reasonably calculated to deceive; (3) made with intent to deceive; (4) which does
in fact deceive; and (5) which results in damage to the injured party." Trull v. Central
Carolina Bank & Trust Co., 450 S.E.2d 542, 545 (N.C. App. 1994), rev. denied, 454 S.E.2d
267 (N.C. 1995).
The general, common law elements necessary to prove a cause of action for fraud or
deceit are: 1) a representation of a false statement of fact known by the party making the
representation to be untrue; 2) an intent to deceive the other person with the
representation and to induce the other party to rely on it; and 3) reliance by the other party
on the misrepresentation that causes the other party to sustain injury or damage. 37 AM.
JUR. 2D Fraudand Deceit § 12 (1968).
55.. Food Lion initially alleged a lengthy, 14-count laundry list of theories against
ABC, including: (1) state tort law violations of intentional misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
negligent supervision, trespass, breach of fiduciary duty, and respondeat superior; (2) civil
conspiracy; (3) violations of federal wiretapping laws; (4) unfair and deceptive trade
practices under North Carolina statutory law; and (5) violations of the federal Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC,
Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, 812 (M.D.N.C. 1995). The federal district court denied ABC's
motion to dismiss Food Lion's claims of fraud, trespass, and civil conspiracy, although it
granted the network's motion to dismiss the federal wiretapping and RICO allegations. Id.
at 824.
56. Philip Morris Co. 1, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1434.
57. Id. at 1438.
58. Id. at 1435.
59. Id.
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because he must use the telephone, travel, and charge items to
effectively investigate and maintain confidentiality, [and] therefore
the discovery should be precludedXer the reporter's privilege against
disclosure of confidential sources.
Food Lion centered on a November 5, 1992 PrimeTime Live
segment that allegedly accused the supermarket chain 61 of selling
expired meat, rat-gnawed cheese and old fish that had been washed
with bleach to hide its rotten stench. 62 To obtain videotape allegedly
depicting some of these activities, producers for the show went
undercover, fraudulently gained employment at a Food Lion store by
lying on employment applications and creating phony references, and
then shot hidden-camera footage. 63 Apparently taking a cue from
Philip Morris, Food Lion served third-party subpoenas on hotels,
letter carrier services, and telecommunications companies with whom
ABC journalists working on the story had done business. 64 Food Lion

60. Id.
61. According to a Food Lion press release sent, unsolicited, to the author of this
article immediately after the jury decision in its favor, Food Lion is "one of the nation's
top-performing grocery companies with more than 1,100 stores in 14 states." Press Release
from Chris Ahearn, Corporate Communications, Food Lion, Food Lion vs. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc. (Feb. 1997) (on file with author). During the week of the PrimeTime Live
expose on Food Lion, however, "the company's market value plummeted by $1.3 billion.
And the show helped hammer Food Lion's profits, which fell from $178 million in 1992 to a
mere $3.9 million the following year, as the chain curbed its expansion plans and eventually
closed 88 stores." Marc Gunther, Yikes, Diane Sawyer's Downstairs!, FORTUNE, Dec. 23,
1996, at 231.
62. The segment charged Food Lion "with the kind of bad housekeeping that would
cause Martha Stewart to faint. Armed with hidden cameras, PrimeTime producers posing
as food handlers infiltrated several Food Lion stores to expose alleged wrongdoings,
including repackaging old chicken with cosmetically enhancing barbecue sauce and
falsifying expiration dates." Ginia Bellafante, Hide and Go Sue, TIME, Jan. 13, 1997, at 81.
The idea for the story "originated with the United Food and Commercial Workers Union
(UFCW), which was waging an aggressive campaign against non-union, fast-growing Food
Lion." Gunther, supra note 61, at 232. In fact, the UFCW "supplied the names of
disgruntled workers to [ABC] through a Washington public-interest group that acted as a
middleman." Id.
63. Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 814-16. For instance, PrimeTime Live employee Lynne
Litt "submitted false references and completed the Food Lion [employment] application
using a false name, false background, false employment history, and false reasons for
seeking work in a Food Lion store." Id. at 815. Litt also called herself Lynne Neufer and/or
Neufes on other applications for employment. Id. "She did not disclose her full time
employment with ABC and PTL [PrimeTime Live]. She falsely represented her address.
She falsely represented her employment history and gave false references ... "Id.
64. Food Lion, 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2432.
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contended it needed the information "so it [could] have a full picture
of ABC's news gathering activities in connection with the Food Lion
story." 65 As it did in Philip Morris, ABC argued that Food Lion's
subpoenas on the disinterested third-parties "improperly impinges on
interest of ABC, namely the protection
a protected First Amendment
66
of confidential sources."
67
In both cases, ABC was subjected to hardball discovery tactics.
It countered those tactics with claims that the qualified First
Amendment reporter's privilege extended far enough to protect
against the indirect discovery of confidential sources. The section
below outlines the reasoning of the courts in agreeing with ABC's
contention.
2. The Courts' Analyses

In Philip Morris, Judge Markow described the issue of whether to
extend the scope of the qualified reporter's privilege as "difficult and
weighty." 68 He began-somewhat prophetically as it turns out, in light
of the discovery tactics in Food Lion- by observing that the discovery
Philip Morris "asks this court to sanction now would invariably lead to
this type of discovery becoming common practice, at least in the realm
of libel law. '"69 Judge Markow then articulated perhaps the most
compelling reason to extend the qualified reporter's privilege to thirdparty subpoenas:
If Philip Morris were allowed discovery of third party records in
order to determine the identity of ABC's confidential sources, it
would be an open invitation for every plaintiff in libel suits, not to
mention the potential in other litigation contexts, to make a pro
forma request for this type of discovery whenever a confidential
source is known to exist. A reporter's promise to maintain
confidentiality would be meaningless if his movements while
investigating were open to scrutiny to glean the identity of his

65. Id. at 2433.
66. Id.
67. For a general discussion of the hard-hitting litigation and discovery tactics that
plagued the battle between Philip Morris and ABC, see Steve Weinberg, Hardball
Discovery, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1995, at 66. In addition to the use of third-party subpoenas to
discover the identity of confidential sources, the acrimonious discovery process in Philip
Morris featured production of documents by the tobacco company on "hard-to-photocopy
paper, dyed dark red, that additionally seemed to have been treated chemically to smell
foul." Id. at 103.
68. Philip Morris Co. 1, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1436.
69. Id. at 1437.
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confidential source.
Judge Markow's fear of a slippery slope effect of a decision
against extending the privilege was also clear in the opinion. He
observed that "if the reporter's privilege were subject to this type of
discovery, then why not other privileged relationships, for example,
the attorney/client privilege?"''
The judge reasoned that:
The implications of allowing the subpoena of third party records in
order to identify confidential sources are grave and strike at the
fundamentals of a free press protected by the First Amendment.
This type of discovery will deter sources from divulging information
7
and deter reporters from gathering and publishing information.
Based on this logic, Judge Markow concluded that the qualified
reporter's privilege protects against the use of disinterested thirdparty subpoenas. 73 Although he initially concluded that Philip Morris
had overcome the privilege and could discover the identity of Deep
Cough, he changed his mind on a motion for reconsideration and held
both that the privilege protected against the use of third-party
subpoenas to identify confidential sources and that Philip Morris had
74
not overcome the qualified privilege.
In Food Lion, Magistrate Judge Sharp relied on Judge Markow's
decision in Philip Morris in concluding that Food Lion's third-party
subpoenas "clearly infringe ABC's First Amendment rights with
regard to its confidential sources. Although the discovery is not
requested directly from ABC, the inquiries directed to third-parties
75
nonetheless implicate ABC's privilege."
With regard to Food Lion's specific requests, the magistrate
reasoned that "inquiries to hotels in particular will reveal confidential
sources, but so may inquiries to letter-carriers and telecommunication
companies regarding entities." 76 As in Philip Morris, the Food Lion
court concluded both that the qualified First Amendment reporter's
privilege applied to third-party subpoenas and that the plaintiff had
not overcome the privilege. The magistrate thus granted ABC's
motion for an emergency protective order requiring Food Lion to
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Id. at 1438.
See Philip Morris Co. 1, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1440.
Food Lion, 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2433.
Id.
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77
immediately withdraw the subpoenas.
The decisions in Philip Morris and Food Lion provide foundation
and precedent for other courts faced with the question of whether
plaintiffs filing civil actions against media defendants can use thirdparty subpoenas to discover the identity of confidential sources
without implicating the First Amendment reporter's privilege. The
precedent is favorable to the press, and the victories won by ABC
should not be forgotten by other media defendants facing similar
situations.
The next section argues, however, that these victories will be
rendered meaningless if certain broadcast news agencies and their
producers continue to flaunt generally applicable state laws that do
not target speech and for which courts are not willing to create a
buffer zone of protection similar to that in the area of source
confidentiality.

II
Pushing the Envelope Too Far?
Broadcast journalists like those at ABC and CBS will continue to
squander judicial victories in the area of source confidentiality when
they flaunt, in the process of gathering news, generally applicable laws
that target neither speech nor press. The principle that courts will not
provide special First Amendment protection for the press in these
by the United States Supreme Court in Cohen v.
cases was articulated
8
Cowles Media Co.

7

A. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.

In Cohen, the Supreme Court held by a narrow 5-4 margin that
First Amendment scrutiny does not apply to or bar a state law
promissory estoppel 79 claim for breach of a reporter's promise of
source confidentiality. 80 Justice Byron White, writing for the majority,
concluded that the case was governed by a "well-established line of
decisions holding that generally applicable laws do not offend the First
77. Id.
78. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
79. Promissory estoppel "is an old Anglo-American legal rule that was promulgated
to prevent injustice when someone fails to keep a promise that he or she has made, a
promise that by itself does not add up to an enforceable contract, but a promise someone
else has relied on." PEMBER, supra note 5, at 331.
80. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 663.
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Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has
81
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report news."
In Cohen, the theory of relief at issue before the Supreme Court
was promissory estoppel.8 2 Promissory estoppel "allows courts to
enforce a promise, even though there is no legally binding contract, in
83
order to avoid injustice."
Justice White wrote that "enforcement of such general laws
against the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be
applied to enforcement against other persons or organizations." 84 The
majority held that "the First Amendment does not confer on the press
a constitutional right to disregard promises that would otherwise be
enforced under state law."8 5 The defining precedent from Cohen,
according to libel experts Sack and Baron, is that "[tihe First
Amendment does not override ordinary tort or breach-of-contract
''
principles imposed on a news-gatherer. 1
B.

Ignoring the Cohen Principle

As in Cohen, the theories of relief brought against ABC by Food
Lion did not target speech. Fraud and trespass are generally
applicable common-law remedies that, unlike libel law, do not target
expression or the media. ABC thus could not successfully seek First
Amendment shelter when it violated these laws. With regard to
potential trespass liability, for instance, the Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press observes that "[w]hen news events occur on
private property, reporters usually will need permission of the
property owner or public officials before entering, even when the
event is a demonstration, a natural disaster, an accident or a criminal
investigation." 87 Although some states have created statutory
exceptions to this general rule, 88 there is no constitutional, First
Amendment right of the press to trespass or to engage in fraud to
obtain information for a news story. As the Supreme Court stated in
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 669.
Id.
Barbara W. Wall & John P. Borger, Broken Promises in the Aftermath of Cohen,
COMM. LAW., Spring 1995, at 1, 17.
84. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670.
85. Id. at 672.
86.
87.
88.

SACK & BARON, supra note 33, at 701.
HANDBOOK, supra note 37, at 27.
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 409.5(d) (West 1994) (providing members of the

media with the right to be present at the scene of disasters and emergencies).
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Branzburgv. Hayes, "[n]ewsmen have no constitutional right of access
to the scenes of crime or disaster when the general public is
excluded. ' 89 The Branzburg Court added that "[i]t is clear that the
First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental burdening of
the press that may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal
statutes of general applicability." 90 Media defense attorney Harold
Fuson admonishes journalists to remember that "[p]rivate property
owners usually have broad rights to exercise this control arbitrarily
and capriciously and to enforce their rights through the law of

trespass." 91 ABC producers, it seems, failed to heed this warning.
ABC, however, is not alone in its apparently not-so-blissful
ignorance. The principle from Cohen intimidated CBS and its
attorneys in a recent dispute with cigarette producer Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. 92 The fight between the now-tarnished
Tiffany network and Brown & Williamson involved a threatened
93
cause of action for tortious interference with contractual relations
against CBS for the actions of its 60 Minutes producers. 94 That legal

89. 408 U.S. 665,684-85 (1972).
90. Id. at 682.
91. FUSON, supra note 38, at 69.
92. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., a unit of London-based B.A.T. Industries
PLC with its principal place of business in Louisville, Ky., is the nation's third largest
tobacco company. Suein L. Hwang & Milo Geyelin, Getting Personal:Brown & Williamson
Has500-Page DossierAttacking Chief Critic,WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1996, at Al.
93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979) (providing the criteria for a
cause of action for intentional interference with the performance of a contract by a third
party). The basic elements for a cause of action for intentional interference with
contractual relations are: "(1) a valid contract between plaintiff and third party; (2)
defendant's knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant's intentional acts designed to induce
a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the
contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage." Savage v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.,
21 Cal. App. 4th 434,448 (1993).
Defendants may raise the affirmative defense of justification-that the interference
must have been made by "either unlawful means or by means otherwise lawful when there
is a lack of sufficient justification." Herron v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 56 Cal. 2d 202, 205
(1961). See generally Sandra S. Baron et al., Tortious Interference: A PracticalPrimerFor
Media Practitioners,2 LITIGATING LIBEL AND PRIVACY SUITS, 483 (PLI/Pat., Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G-447, 1996) (providing
an overview of the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations and its
applicability to journalistic newsgathering practices).
94. See generally Lawrence K. Grossman, CBS, 60 Minutes, and the Unseen Interview,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 39 (providing an overview of the facts and
issues in the dispute between CBS and Brown & Williamson); William Bennett Turner,

News Media Liability for "Tortious Interference" with a Source's Nondisclosure Contract,
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theory, like fraud,, trespass and promissory estoppel does not target

speech. Rather, the gist of tortious interference is "found in the
common law tort principle that one who intentionally induces another
to break a valid contract is, unless such conduct is privileged, liable for
95
damages legally caused thereby."
The CBS/Brown & Williamson dispute centered on whether the
network's actions in getting a former employee of the cigarette
company, Jeffrey Wigand, to "tell all" about the tobacco industry on a
60 Minutes episode interfered with Brown & Williamson's nondisclosure contract with the ex-employee. 96 The contract forbade

Jeffrey Wigand from discussing his employment at Brown &
Williamson.
CBS's conduct, however, created the appearance that it induced
Wigand to breach the non-disclosure agreement. Specifically, the
network agreed to indemnify him against any defamation action that
might result from his statements on the show. 97 It also had paid the
whistle-blowing former employee $12,000 as a consultant for previous
work on 60 Minutes episodes. 98 The network gave Wigand veto power

over the story before it was to air.99 The illusion of a quid pro quo
agreement between CBS and Wigand was thus created-he would
talk, but only in return for cash, indemnification, and editorial control
over the episode.
After meeting with their attorneys, CBS executives decided not to

run the sizzling expos6 on the tobacco industry. 100 Why? They
COMM. LAW., Spring 1996, at 13 (recapping the facts and issues involving CBS's potential
liability to Brown & Williamson on the theory of interference with contractual relations).
95. FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OFTORTS § 6.5, at 303 (2d ed. 1986).
96. Bill Carter, Dispute Erupts at '60 Minutes' Over Canceling of Interview, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 1995, at A10.
97. Alix M. Freedman et al., Tort TV-CBS Legal Guarantees to "60 Minutes" Source
Muddy Tobacco Story, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1995, at Al.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Elizabeth Jensen, CBS's Lund Says '60 Minutes' Decision Wasn't Linked to
Westinghouse Deal, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1995, at B14. CBS eventually broadcast a similar
version of the original, unaired 60 Minutes episode featuring the Jeffrey Wigand interview
in February, 1996, but only after The Wall Street Journalhad already reported substantially
the same information. See Frank Rich, Smoking Guns at '60 Minutes,' N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
1996, at A23 (observing that CBS's decision to run the broadcast some three months after
it originally killed the piece was "only half-heroic. It was precipitated not by newfound
courage from CBS's lawyers but by The Wall Street Journal,which a week ago obtained
and published its own account of Mr. Wigand's allegations, thereby reducing CBS's risk of
a lawsuit from Brown & Williamson, Mr. Wigand's former employer.").
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apparently feared liability for intentional interference with the
confidentiality agreement. 1 1
Analyzing CBS's decision to spike the story, media defense
attorney David Kohler observed that the Cohen decision put the
network on shaky legal ground. 10 2 He noted that under Cohen, "the
First Amendment does not shield the media from general laws not

particularly aimed at speech.' 1 3 Therefore a First Amendment
defense may have proved unsuccessful. 104
Moreover, media attorney Cameron DeVore observed that
Cohen was powerful precedent in CBS's decision to cave to Brown &
Williamson. 10 5 DeVore was retained by CBS as outside counsel to
evaluate potential legal liability for the Wigand interview. 10 6 In

response to sharp criticism of the network's decision to kill the
episode, 10 7 DeVore fired back in a letter to The New York Times:
The legal issue here involves whether a tort, here interference with a
contractual relationship, is trumped by the First Amendment. The
only time that happened in any significant way since 1964, when the
Supreme Court constitutionalized the law of defamation in New
York Times v. Sullivan, was in 1988 in Falwell v. Hustler, dealing
with the closely related law of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
I'm sure that the "many legal scholars" you contacted must have
told you that while the Supreme Court has continued its strong
protection for reputational torts, it has not recently provided any

First Amendment protection for news gathering.
The most 1 ecent example was Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.

Broadcast journalists-all

journalists

for that

matter-will

101. Grossman, supra note 94, at 44-45.
102. See David Kohler, Blame the Laws, Mr. Wallace, Not the Lawyers, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 21, 1995, at A16. See also Turner, supra note 94, at 13, 14 (providing an excellent
overview of media liability for interference with non-disclosure contracts in light of the
dispute between Brown & Williamson and CBS, and observing that the "case overlooked
by the lawyers so quick to criticize CBS's killing of the Wigand interview is Cohen v.
Cowles Media, Inc. [sic].").
103. Kohler, supra note 102, at A16.
104. Id.
105. P. Cameron DeVore, In CBS Tobacco Case, Contract Came Before First
Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,1995, at E12.
106. Grossman, supra note 94, at 44.
107. See, e.g., Self-Censorship at CBS, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1995, at E14 (opining that
"media companies in play lose their journalistic aggressiveness when they let lawyers and
corporate executives make decisions that ought to be the province of news executives.").
108. DeVore, supra note 105.
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continue to suffer defeats in and out of courtrooms when they violate
generally applicable laws that target neither speech nor the press. If
they persist in such conduct, the hard-fought victories on the source
confidentiality issue will be overshadowed and rendered meaningless.
It is important to point out that when ABC made a motion in
Food Lion to dismiss the charges of fraud, trespass, and civil
conspiracy filed against it, the federal district court judge considering
the motion relied on Cohen to support his decision not to dismiss
those theories of relief. 109 The Food Lion judge observed:
In this case, Food Lion has alleged that ABC has committed fraud,
trespass, and other wrongful acts. Like promissory estoppel, the laws
governing this behavior are laws of general, applicability which do
not 'target or single out the press.' Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670, 111 S.Ct.
at 2518. Therefore, ABC, as a member of the press, has no special
immunity from the application of laws such as North Carolina's
unfair and deceptive trade practices statute, and
110 the First
Amendment does not bar Food Lion's claims against it.
C.

The Wake-Up Bomb1 11 from FoodLion

When the Supreme Court handed down its ruling in Cohen, many
journalists apparently slumbered. There, the Court stated that the
First Amendment does not shield the press from the reach of
generally applicable laws that do not target speech. 112 Food Lion is a
wake-up bomb for those journalists, that "[t]he tort of fraudulent
newsgathering has come of age." 113 Even if eventually overturned on
appeal, 114 ABC has racked up-and will continue to rack upexorbitant legal fees in defending the actions of its reporters.
Food Lion illustrates that journalists may lawfully use
confidential sources to obtain that information, but they may not use
fraud to obtain information. While journalists may gather news, they
are not above the law in doing so. When they fail to heed that simple
109. Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 822.
110. Id.
111. See R.E.M., The Wake-Up Bomb, on NEW ADVENTURES IN Hi-Fi (Warner Bros.
1996).
112. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 663.
113. Robert A. Bertsche, $5.5M Ruling Against ABC Highlights Growing Risks of
Undercover Reports, TIPS COMMITrEE NEWS (Media Law and Defamation Torts
Committee of the American Bar Association), Winter 1997, at 1.
114. In August, 1997 a federal judge denied ABC's motion to overturn the jury's
verdict but reduced the punitive damage award from $5.5 million to $315,000. Mifflin,
supra note 3, at 1, 10.
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warning, they face danger from hostile jurors.
In a recent law journal article before the jury's decision in Food
Lion, I noted, "how news is gathered is becoming as important as what
the news says." 115 Thus Food Lion reinforces "a terrain-shifting new
development in First Amendment jurisprudence: plaintiffs attacking
the media not based on whether the media tell the truth, but on how
' 116
they get the information."
The lesson that journalists may be liable for how they get the
news shouldn't be that difficult to understand. The Food Lion jurors
were not suggesting that investigative reporting should be banned or
prohibited. As one juror put it, "I'm not expecting every news station
in the world to shut down and not be able to operate. But you don't
' 117
have to make up information."
D. Arrogance, Ignorance & Animosity

What makes the current situation especially problematic is the
apparent arrogance, and ignorance, of certain segments of the
journalism community. Journalists fail to acknowledge the flaws in
their investigative techniques. Instead they believe that cloaking
themselves in the almighty First Amendment will protect them from
both judicial and public scorn. Writing in The New York Times about
the jury verdict in Food Lion, Paul Starobin of the Columbia
Journalism Review observed: "When a North Carolina jury took a
swipe at hidden-camera television expos6s last week, the press mostly
circled the wagons and declared it a travesty. But what the Fourth
Estate is defending is shoddy journalism, unworthy of the best tradition
of investigative reporting." 118 Starobin was not the only journalist to
acknowledge this problem.
William Powers of the New Republic mockingly observed, "[n]o
sooner had the jury in Greensboro, North Carolina, reached its
decision... than the guard dogs of the First Amendment were in the
115.

Stumbling, supra note 2, at 160; see also Alicia C. Shepard, Fighting Back, AM.

JOURNALISM REV., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 34 (describing how corporations and individuals

attacked by the media are fighting the way information is obtained rather than the merits
of the story).
116. Joseph D. Steinfeld & Robert A. Bertsche, An Introduction, and an Invitation to
Contributors,TIPS COMMITTEE NEWS (Media Law and Defamation Torts Committee of
the American Bar Association), Winter 1997, at 2.
117. Bertsche, supra note 113, at 1.
118. Paul Starobin, Why Those Hidden CamerasHurt Journalism,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
1997, at A30.
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streets, howling in their usual fashion." 119 Powers further noted that:
The defenders of the media's right to investigate and report are to
some degree, missing the point. They argue as if we live in a world
that is dominated by conscientious, credible journalism and
threatened by these anti-press verdicts. But we don't, certainly not
where television is concerned. One careful look at the ubiquitous
magazine shows is all one needs to see why there are so many ,of
these lawsuits, and why juries are coming down against the
newsgatherers. The news-standards of these shows and the ethical
standards that guide them as they gather news "0
which is what the
Food Lion case was about) are often terribly low.
Writing about Food Lion in The Washington Post, veteran
journalist Jonathan Yardley astutely identified the problem that
journalists and producers like those at PrimeTime Live face:
Those of use who have indescribably good fortune to work in the
Media Bigfoot Capital of the Universe too often forget that people
elsewhere do not always see matters quite as we do, notably matters
pertaining to... us. While we work ourselves into hysteria at
anything remotely resembling a threat to the press freedoms of
which we fancy ourselves guardians, people elsewhere have the
temerity to believe that those freedoms
must be exercised within
12 1
limits we occasionally recognize.
Yardley's recognition that there are limits on press freedom was
echoed by a juror in Food Lion. The juror summed up a good rule for
the press to follow in precisely the kind of sports-clich6 style of writing
to which many journalists are so enamored. 122 He observed that "[tihe
media has [sic] the right to bring the news, but they have to watch
what they do. It's like a football game. There are boundaries and you
' 123
have to make sure you don't go outside the boundaries."
That piece of somewhat folksy, home-spun advice should be as
important to journalists as any handed down by a New York City
media defense attorney billing out at more than $300 an hour for
information gathered by a summer associate from a handbook on
media law. The First Amendment has its boundaries, its limits of
protection. Courts are willing to expand and extend those boundaries

119. William Powers, Making Sausage, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 20, 1997, at 14.
120. Id. at 15.
121. Jonathan Yardley, The Food Lion Jurors' Reverberating Roar, WASH. POST, Jan.
27, 1997, at C2.
122.

See JAMES FALLOWS, BREAKING THE NEWS: HOW THE MEDIA UNDERMINE

DEMOCRACY 156-181 (1996) (describing the proclivity of journalists to portray politics in
the terms and framework of sports).
123. Yardley, supra note 121, at C2.
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in the area of source confidentiality, but journalists are sadly mistaken
to believe that either courts or jurors will expand those boundaries
when they violate generally applicable legal principles like fraud and
trespass. "The message, at least from 12 North Carolina jurors, is that
deception and cameras-hidden-in-wigs are over the line, even in the
124
pursuit of a good story."
Are investigative journalists going to learn from Food Lion? If
they are unable to learn from the Supreme Court decision in Cohen,
will they be able to learn anything from the Food Lion decision or will
125
they be like Alicia Silverstone's character in that movie-clueless?
Only time will tell for sure.
At CBS News, president Andrew Heyward seems to be getting
the message. He observed that "[t]here is a public disenchantment to a
degree with exploitive journalism.' 126 Roone Arledge, president of
ABC News, acknowledged that "in light of this decision we're going to
have to take a harder look at how we do these thin s.But we won't be
7 '
deterred from bona fide investigative journalism."'
When journalists' definitions of bona fide investigative
journalism-whatever that means-clash with judicial and public
beliefs about legitimate news gathering practices, sparks will continue
to fly in courtrooms and journalists will beat their chests about the
First Amendment and freedom of the press. In the end, however,
press credibility-a journalist's stock in trade-is eroded in the
public's eyes and hard-won courtroom victories in areas like source
confidentiality are squandered. That is too high of a price to pay for
getting the news. As journalist Ginia Bellafante put it, "some soul128
searching on the part of news organizations wouldn't hurt."
E. Excuses, Excuses, Excuses: The Public's Right to Know Defense
To justify abusive and intrusive news gathering techniques like
those in Food Lion, the press often turns to a well-worn mantra-the
public's right to know. Journalism professor Christopher Meyers
observes, "[a]n appeal to the public's right to know serves as the core
element of the journalism ethos, as revealed in the great ado
surrounding the 200th Anniversary of the ratification of the First
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Howard Kurtz, Is ItTime To Stop The Presses?, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1997, at C1.
CLUELESS (Paramount Pictures 1996).
Bellafante, supra note 62, at 81.
Kurtz & Pressley, surpanote 3, at Al.
Bellafante, supra note 62, at 81.
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129

Amendment."
Why is the time-honored right-to-know mantra so appealing to
journalists? Professor Meyers argues that it "provides a greater good
defense, giving journalists (supposed) valid moral reasons for
130
engaging in what would otherwise be seen as improper behavior."
He points out, however, that "journalists often confuse having a right
13 1
to know with having an interest or curiosity in knowing."'
Philosopher and ethicist Sissela Bok concurs with Professor Meyers,
observing that "[t]he confusing expression 'the public's right to know'
is often used to justify all that reporters do to cater to both need and
132
interest on the part of the public, of whatever degree of legitimacy."'
In other words, in the case of Food Lion, the hidden-camera
footage in question made for interesting viewing, but was the footage
necessary for telling the story? Were the intrusive news gathering
techniques essential for telling or revealing a supposed greater good?
Alternatively, could the same information have been gathered by
other less deceptive, legal methods? Were fraud and trespass used by
ABC producers simply because hidden-camera reporting is a cute
gimmick that attracts a profitably large audience share and garners
great ratings? Parsed more simply, the question is: Do supposedly
noble ends justify fraudulent means?
According to media defense attorney and First Amendment
zealot Jane Kirtley, the answer is an unflinching yes. With regard to
Food Lion, she observed:
Just the fact that Food Lion won the first round is bad enough. Even
if they ultimately come out with only 1€ in damages, the jury will be
sending the message that even when a news organization is telling a
story about public health and safety, and truth is not at issue, 1it'S
3 still
possible for a conglomerate [Food Lion] to win a jury verdict.
In other words, the ends justify the means. The importance of the
subject matter-information that affects public health and safety, as
Kirtley accurately describes it-justifies any means of uncovering or
revealing that information. The issue was apparently so important to
the producers at PrimeTime Live that it justified deception, lying, and
129.- Christopher Meyers, Justifying JournalisticHarms: Right to Know vs. Interest in
Knowing, 8 J. MASS MEDIA ETHICS 133, 134 (1993).

130. Id.
131. Id. at 135.
132.
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deceit. 134 It was "bad enough," as Kirtley put it, that ABC could be
held accountable for fraud and trespass, laws that apply to everyone.
The public's right to know excuse puts the press above compliance
with generally applicable laws. One is left to wonder how far
individuals like Kirtley would take this argument. If journalists had to
punch out a security guard to gain access to a Food Lion store, would
it be "bad enough" if journalists were held accountable for assault and
battery? Do the ends always justify the means?
Whatever some journalists and media defense attorneys may
think, neither the public nor the judiciary is ready to fully endorse the
"right to know" excuse as a defense for all intrusive news gathering
practices. Journalists must do more than spout clich6s about the socalled right to know if they want courts and the public to understand
their behavior. They must make reasoned arguments, providing clear
explanations of and justifications for their actions before they
convince judges to extend the same kind of protection given to protect
sources' identities to other news gathering practices. Furthermore,
media defense attorneys must make these arguments understandable
and clear to jurors.
F.

13 5
Isn't It Ironic... Don't You Think?

"If large corporations were allowed to stop hard-hitting
136
investigative journalism, the American people would be the losers,"
ABC News President Roone Arledge was quoted in the Los Angeles
Times, lamenting the jury verdict in Food Lion. This echoes Kirtley's
concern from Food Lion that "even when a news organization is
not at issue,
telling a story about public health and safety, and truth is 137
it's still possible for a conglomerate to win a jury verdict.
Those statements scream for analysis. In each quotation, Food
Lion is portrayed either as a large corporation or a conglomerate that
has been brazen enough to use its might and wealth to attack
journalists in their noble pursuit of the truth. Those journalists, of

134. Philosopher Sissela Bok defines a lie as "any intentionally deceptive message
which is stated." SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC LIFE 13
(1989)(emphasis added).
135. See ALANIS MORISSETrE, Ironic, on JAGGED LITTLE PILL (Maverick Recording
Co. 1995) (singing "isn't it ironic.., don't you think. A little too ironic.., and yeah I
really do think.").
136. Randolph, supra note 3, at A15.
137. Bellafante, supra note 62, at 81.
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course, would be the ones employed by a major television network,
ABC, which in turn is owned by this upstart little company from
Southern California called Walt Disney Co. 138 The sarcasm dripping
from that sentence about Disney as a "little company" is matched only
by the irony in the statements of Arledge and Kirtley portraying Food
Lion as the big bully picking on the scrawny journalist.
This was not a battle between David and Goliath. This was a
battle between two large conglomerates. The larger of the two,
Disney, actually lost. Perhaps Arledge and Kirtley have the players in
this courtroom drama mixed up. Perhaps they were blinded by the
light of the hidden cameras.
For journalists and media defense attorneys to portray Food Lion
as a battle in which a supposedly big, bad grocery store squashes
journalists armed only with pens and notepads is just factually
inaccurate. It is little more than an effort to shift the focus-to change
the issue-away from the investigative practices of journalists toward
the financial status of the plaintiffs they attack. Such obfuscation will
only lead to further courtroom frustrations for journalists like those at
PrimeTime Live. Instead of shifting the blame and denying the
problem like an alcoholic who can't admit that he drinks too much,
journalists need to engage in self-examination and self-reflection.
III
Conclusion
Distinguished journalist Vermont Royster once proclaimed that
"[t]here can be no freedom of the press unless the press has the right
to be irresponsible." 139 The Food Lion case reveals that while
journalists have the right to be irresponsible, they also may pay a very
high price for that right in courtrooms. Courts are willing to protect
news gathering practices that they deem part of responsible
journalism, such as the use of confidential sources. On the other hand,
fraudulent news gathering practices such as lying on employment
applications to go undercover are not within the ambit of responsible
journalism. These practices fall outside the realm of First Amendment
protection.
138. See generally George Garneau, Disney Enters News Business, EDITOR &
Aug. 5, 1995, at 5 (describing Walt Disney Co.'s purchase of Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc.).
139. Theodore L. Glasser, Press Responsibility and First Amendment Values, in
RESPONSIBLE JOURNALISM 81 (Deni Elliott ed., 1986).
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Maybe journalists like those at PrimeTime Live will finally learn
this lesson. The First Amendment is not a sword that allows
journalists to run roughshod over others, to break generally applicable
laws with impunity. A little humility on the part of journalists-a little
introspection and reflection about news gathering practices-will be
helpful not only to reporters and their editors and producers, but also
to a disgruntled public that is increasingly incensed by journalistic
arrogance.
Furthermore, the public should be invited by journalists to
participate in a dialogue about news gathering practices. 140 This gives
journalists a chance to educate the public about the importance of
their role as a watch-dog in a self-governing democracy. It also gives
journalists the opportunity to hear the reasons why many individuals
are so disgusted with journalists and their actions. Discourse and
dialogue are important in a democracy. Journalists who expose the
practices of other institutions-the government, grocery stores,
cigarette companies-to public scrutiny should also-expose their own
activities to public scrutiny and critique.
For those individuals such as Roone Arledge who are concerned
with the potential chilling effect on investigative reporting that Food
Lion may portend, it must be remembered that "the only chilling
effect is likely to be on cheap entertainment masquerading as
investigative reporting."'141 It was not the per se use of hidden cameras
that got ABC into trouble; it was the lying to get into the Food Lion
plant in the first place-the fraud-that got the network into legal
trouble. If the verdict chills lying, there is nothing wrong with that.
Journalists deal in facts and the truth, not lies.

140. ABC must be commended for taking a baby-step forward on this point when it ran
a special "Viewpoint" edition of Nightline in February, 1997, in which Ted Koppel
moderated a discussion about newsgathering methods and journalistic ethics. Bill Carter,
Questions of Fairness, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1997, at C16. More is needed, however, than
sudden and sporadic fits of self-reflection and public critique.
141. Yardley, supra note 121, at C2.

